At the beginning of the 19th century, France's principal enemy was Britain. All of France's actions, curiously the military actions, must in that locationfore be interpreted in light of that one fact. Britain itself was a sufficiently strong imperium for an enemy, and the Directors knew better than to acquire a nonher one, even the relatively weakly Ottoman empire. Bonaparte did not actually want to worry Egypt because it was well away from the Mediterranean expansion he cherished. The Directors wanted an invasion. A crosschannel invasion was too hazardous, so expansion was couched in terms the Directors wanted but not with the hazards an invasion involved. Egypt was chosen twain because of its proximity to India and because the Ottomans were having trouble with the Mamluk vassals there; France could be seen as helping the Ottomans. Meanwhile Napoleon was not really planning an invasion but hoped to divert British weaponry to that playing field so that his European battles could be more(prenominal) easily won. Napoleon and other Frenchmen also thought that the Ottomans would appreciate having a friendlier France rule Egypt than the rebellious Mamluks (Yapp 50).
France was wrong on both assumptions. India was important to Britain, but not as much as every Frenchman believed. Se
But the forerunner cause of European concern with the Near East goes buns to the Christian pilgrims to the Holy Land being kidnapped, raped, robbed, and killed by Islamics. From the crusades to founding War I, European nations were concerned that fellow Christians in the area were not mistreated by the Ottoman Empire. A noteworthy indication of their attitude towards the integrity of that empire is that these heads of state did not call for a new government, nor mount a design effort to institute one, but negotiated with the government as it existed. The heart of the conflict was the continued call for independence by the Christian communities and the continued refusal of the Ottomans to grant independence.
France's invasion of Egypt was politically meaningless for France and about as meaningless for Egypt except the invasion aided Egypt's economic development by calling on Egyptians to supply the armies. These armies, however, left wing behind both the ideas of the French revolution and the words for these ideas. Without this strength to name a political condition, the liberals in the empire would plausibly have not been able to articulate their complaints about abuses they began in the 19th century and voice the calls for reforms that accompanied these complaints.
Through the millets and European invovlement in them as "protectors", the Ottomans were left with a dilemma of implementation. The edicts of 1839 and 1856 should be seen as principles and not as rights such as the U.S. file of Rights. The main principles the Tanzimat was stating were equating and security for all citizens, removal of administrative abuses, and administrative and economic development. While all could agree on the value of the third principle, the first and second had various interpretations. Was "equality" a common code for all citizens, Moslem and nonMoslem? Or was "equality" the maintainance of cultural and religious identity? The author was in the goals of the secular Ottoman sta
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